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EUROPEAN LAW IN THE EMPIRES OF MECHANICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF EUROPEAN LAW 
IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES
Zdeněk Kühn∗
Summary: The process of European enlargement had a peculiar nature. Prior to 
accession in 2004, EU law was not yet formally binding on EU candidates’ domestic  
courts,  while  the  obligation  of  gradual  harmonisation  with  EU law rested  upon 
them. Consequently, the application of EU law in future Member States presented  
particularly interesting problems and challenges, and required an understanding of  
the sophisticated concept of EU law’s persuasive force. The only rational choice was  
to  apply  Community  law,  taking  into  account  not  only  the  limited  scope  of  the  
legislative texts for harmonisation, but also Community law in its full meaning. This  
included the texts of European directives, which had to be transposed into domestic  
law, as well as their reasoning and rationale, which would explain why a particular  
policy was regulated at the European level; ECJ jurisprudence; and, ideally, also  
the case law of EU Member States. This article argues that this involves a special  
type of use of comparative law. 
I. The use of EU law in associated states as a theoretical problem
Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic modified their constitutions prior to 
1  May 2004 in  order  to  facilitate  their  EU accession and transfer  some of  their 
sovereign powers to the EU.1 However, their relations with the EU were based on 
association agreements before the Enlargement. At the same time, their association 
agreements formed the bulk of ordinary international treaty law, while the use of the 
association agreements in Central Europe was governed by the national constitutions 
and the clauses on the relation between municipal and international law.
All Central European countries were obliged to remodel their legal systems 
and make them gradually compatible with the  acquis communautaire.2 All  things 
considered,  it  would  be  ineffective  to  approach  the  obligations  flowing  from 
association  agreements  like  an  ordinary  international  treaty.  First,  European  law 
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of International Law, p. 27.
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served  as  a  model  in  legislation.  EU  law,  however,  should  also  be  used  as  an 
argumentative tool for the consistent interpretation of domestic law with EU law. 
Since EU law was not formally binding within the associated states, the very nature 
of  association  seemed  to  call  for  a  sophisticated  concept  of  a  strong  persuasive 
source of law.3 Below, I will  argue that  the use of EU law in the application of 
domestic law before the accession was a special type of use of comparative law in 
the interpretation of domestic law in the associated states.
I.1 Obligatory Use of Comparative Law
Ulrich  Drobnig  distinguished  three  categories  of  use  of  comparative  law 
when interpreting domestic law.4 The first is the use of comparative law which might 
be  considered  obligatory.  This  is  followed  by  the  non-obligatory  but  highly 
recommended  use  of  foreign  law  in  cases  with  a  foreign  element.  Finally,  and 
conceptually most interesting, there is comparative argumentation in cases with a 
purely domestic character.
Obligatory comparative reasoning relates to the cases where comparison is 
necessary, because “recourse to foreign law and in some cases even true comparison 
is inevitable for the proper application of the rules”.5 An important example at the 
EU level  is  the  use  of  general  legal  principles  of  member  states  when the  ECJ 
interprets EU law.6 The national legal systems here play a dual role: on the one hand 
formally a foreign law to the European Court, on the other hand an auxiliary source 
of EU law, assuring the open and dynamic nature of EU law.7 For instance, Art. 
288(2) of the EC Treaty proclaims that the non-contractual liability of the EC shall 
be determined “in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of 
member  states”.8 Another  example  is  the  comparatively  conceived  conception  of 
human rights within the area of EU law, based on “constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States”.9
3 Generally Glenn, Persuasive Authority (1987) 32 McGill Law Journal p. 261.
4 Drobnig,  General Report, In: Drobnig and van Erp (eds.)  THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS  
(1997)  The  Hague/London/Boston:  Kluwer  Law  International,  p.  1  ff.  I  follow and  modify  this 
classification for the purpose of my paper.
5 Ibid., at 6.
6 Cf. recently Lenaerts,  Interlocking Legal Orders or the European Union Variant of ‘E Pluribus  
Unum’,  in:  Nafziger,  Symeonides (eds.),  LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD (,  (2002) 
Transnational  Publishers,  New York,  p.  751-778.  Comparative  law  is  not  argumentation  by  the 
general or fundamental principles of EU law, which are the product of EU law proper, i.e. EU primary 
and secondary law. To identify various types of these principles, cf. Tridimas, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF EC LAW (1999) Oxford University Press, Oxford, at 3 ff. Cf. also the distinction clearly postulated 
by the ECJ itself, when this court proclaimed that in its decision-making it decides ‘in accordance 
with the generally accepted methods of interpretation, in particular by reference to the fundamental 
principles of the Community legal system and, where necessary,  general principles common to the 
legal principles of the Member States.’ Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v  
Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame  
Ltd and others  [1996] European Court Reports I-1029, para. 27.  Only the latter (general principles 
common to the Member States) means the use of comparative law proper.
7 Cf. Bengoetxea, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE. TOWARDS A EUROPEAN 
JURISPRUDENCE. (1993) Clarendon Press, Oxford, at 79. On this method in the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
recently, cf. Lenaerts, see n.6 (claiming that comparative law ‘plays a central role’ at the ECJ and the 
Court of First Instance).
8 Generally Kiikeri, COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING AND EUROPEAN LAW (2001) Dordrecht/ Boston/ 
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, or Koopmans, Comparative Law and the Courts (1996) 45 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly p. 545. The use of general principles of law within EU 
law is not limited to the articles that explicitly refer to those principles. See the following note.
2
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
A third example is the use of the case law of signatories to an international 
treaty, interpreting the treaty if the treaty is applied within the national legal system 
and is part of the “law of the land”.10 A national judge interpreting international law 
must  take into  account  the  way international  rule  is  interpreted by the  courts  of 
foreign nations.11 Art. 7(1) of the Convention of International Sale of Goods in this 
regard emphasises that “[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had 
to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application 
and the observance of good faith in international trade.”12 For instance, the United 
States  Supreme  Court  remarked  that  in  interpreting  a  problematic  term  of  an 
international treaty “we find the opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled to 
considerable weight.”13
I.2 Non-obligatory Use of Foreign Law in Cases with an International Element
The other two groups lack the “necessary” comparative feature of judicial 
reasoning.  The second group, however, still has a foreign or international element. 
In spite of that, the comparison is not mandatory, but in specific cases it would often 
be highly desirable to use it in order to find a solution that suits the legal system best. 
An example is the interpretation of a uniform international rule codified as domestic 
law  by  the  national  legislature.  As  uniform  international  rules  have  a  unifying 
character, it is rational to observe the interpretation of those rules by other nations. 
However, it does not follow that it is always the practice of the courts, as the national 
9 Case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities,  
[1974], European Court Reports 491, para. 13. Kiikeri remarked that ‘this is not only a statement of 
the static existence of general principles common to the member states, but that, for that matter, it 
imposes an obligation to follow the development of the case-law of the ECHR and argumentation in 
these cases and to oversee the development of the national constitutions in this respect. In some ways, 
it confirms the position of comparative analysis as a dynamic part of the legal sources of the European 
Community legal system.’ Kiikeri, see n. 8, at 112.
10 For  example,  U.S.  CONST.  Art.  VI,  §  2.  All  Central  European  nations  except  Hungary  have 
incorporated international law into their domestic legal orders.
11 Cf. Conforti,  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS  (1993) transl. Provost, 
Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  Dordrecht,  at  107-108 (Claiming that  ‘Subsequent  practice’  may be 
derived from judicial precedents from all contracting States and, as such, is especially important with 
respect to uniform law conventions, given their goal of uniformity.’ Yet, Conforti admits that ‘the role 
of comparative law must not be exaggerated. In fact, treaty interpretation relies on subsequent practice 
as a supplementary element only. It is quite conceivable that foreign precedents could be irrelevant for 
any number of reasons: because they do violence to the wording of the convention, because they 
narrowly construe the treaty’s object and purpose, or because they tend to give unilateralist answers’). 
Cf.  the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, Article 31(3b), which states that 
when interpreting a treaty, there shall be taken into account, together with the context, any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.  On the problems relating to the application of these treaties generally, cf. Grosswald 
Curran, The Interpretive Challenge to Uniformity (1995) 15 Journal of Law and Commerce p. 175. 
12 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980), Art. 7(1) In 
more detail Ferrari, Recent Development: CISG: Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial  
Application and Scholarly Writing (1995) 15 Journal of Law and Commerce p. 1, 8-13 and notes 
therein.
13 Air France v. Saks 470 U.S. 392, at 404 (1985) (citation omitted), interpreting the Warsaw 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 1929, 
dealing with the French decision and European scholars.
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law often tends to view those rules as purely national without any comparative aspect 
from the very moment those rules are implemented in national sources of law.14
The family of common law countries, sharing a common conception of law 
based on its  English origins,  is  an example  of  comparative  interpretation  of  law 
shared  with  other  countries.15 Common  law  is  an  example  of  the  relatively 
homogenous system of unwritten legal rules, language, values, legal culture, as well 
as  the  conception  of  law  as  a  whole.16 Continental  micro-groups  (like  France, 
Luxembourg, and Belgium, based on revolutionary French codification) also share 
much more than merely written law, and the shared features include legal mentality, 
language, legal ideas, doctrines and paradigms.17 However, the difference between 
common  law  and  Continental  law  traditions  should  not  be  neglected,  as  the 
Continental system generally tends toward a more national approach to law than the 
common  law  system,  which  causes  significant  problems  in  the  application  of 
European law.
I.3 Comparative Argumentation in the Application of Law of Purely Domestic 
Character
Finally, we can find comparative argumentation of  laws of purely domestic  
character. Apparently, the dividing line between the third and second group is not 
entirely  clear,  especially  vis-à-vis  legal  transplants.  Here,  comparative  argument 
might be considered in an important concrete case.
In  integrating Europe,  however,  the  very concept  of  the  law of  “a  purely 
domestic character” might be disputed. K.P. Berger assumes that the transformation 
of  comparative  law from a branch of  legal  methodology at  the beginning of  the 
twentieth century to becoming a much more substantive tool within the last decades 
alters the mentality of lawyers and makes them explicitly recognise “that it is today 
impossible  for  lawyers  to  limit  their  reasoning  to  the  framework  of  their  own 
domestic system.” Such change would have a major influence on the domestic courts 
within the EU even in fields not governed by EU law:
[T]he  domestic  courts  may  no  longer  remain  in  domestic  isolation  by 
referring to the long standing tradition of their  legal  system. Instead,  they 
have to take into account the solution found for certain problems by the courts 
of  other  EU  jurisdictions,  even  if  the  case  before  them  involves  a  legal 
problem that has not been harmonised by the EU Commission.18
14 Drobnig, see n. 4, 11 ff.; Zweigert, Kötz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW  (Weir transl.) 
(1998) Oxford: Clarendon Press, at 21 (‘when a national judge is faced with a uniform law, he must 
not simply deploy his trusty old national rules of construction but modify them so as to arrive at an 
internationally acceptable result which promotes legal uniformity’).
15 Cf. Drobnig’s term ‘rules shared with other countries’, ibid.., at 12. I prefer call it ‘law’ rather than 
simply ‘rules.’
16 Common law seems to be much more ‘transnational’ than one could expect from the position of a 
positivistic perspective of a domestic legal order. It possesses a unique ‘consciousness that common 
law is a whole.’ Örücü, Comparative Law in British Courts, In: Drobnig and van Erp (eds.), The Use 
of Comparative Law by Courts (1997) (, , The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, at 
257. As Örücü rightly points, this temptation is truly unique, and is comparable, perhaps, only to the 
Islamic legal family. Ibid.
17 Zweigert, Kötz, see n. 14, 101 ff. Another example might be Scandinavian countries (Peczenik, ON 
LAW AND REASON (1989) Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers) or the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
both sharing the Czechoslovak legal heritage.
18 Berger,  Harmonisation of European Contract Law, The Influence of Comparative Law, (2001) 50 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly p. 877, at 887, emphasis added. 
4
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
In this sense, no European rule is of a “purely domestic nature.” All rules 
have  at  least  the  potential  to  become “Europeanised”,  and this  deprives  national 
judges of the possibility to refuse to consider foreign law solutions. Members of the 
Commission of European Contract Law expressly claim in their comparative project, 
patterned on the American Restatements of the Law,19 that their work (Principles of 
European  Contract  Law)  is  “available  for  the  assistance  of  European courts  and 
legislatures concerned to ensure the fruitful development of contract law on a Union-
wide basis.”20
Berger  concludes  that  the  process  of  legal  convergence  “must  lead  to  a 
European system of precedents.”21 Although a critic would say that Berger’s appeals 
for  a  “European  system  of  precedents”  are  still  more  of  a  wish  expressed  by 
European academics than reality in most EU nations, Berger claims that this doctrine 
might be justified by the principle of equal treatment contained in Art. 21 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as the spirit of harmonisation of law “which 
directs courts in EU Member States to follow precedents rendered by courts in other 
Member  States”.22 “Ultimately,  a  European  doctrine  of  precedents  should  be  an 
expression of  a  ‘shared-values’  approach to the  decision of  legal  disputes  which 
flows from the spirit of European integration.”23 
On  the  other  hand,  the  European  rule  of  precedent  in  the  fields  not  yet 
harmonised must be based on a persuasive force of precedent rather than on a formal 
and binding precedent, because the very idea of transnational judicial conversation 
presupposes discourse based on the force of reason, not on the force of authority. The 
European doctrine of precedents opens “the huge stockpile of legal solutions of the 
courts of the EU Member Countries without interfering with domestic mandatory 
rules  and  the  dogmatic  constraints  of  their  legal  systems.”24 However,  these 
constraints  are  usually  flexible  enough  to  encompass  a  broad  circle  of  various 
solutions which would fit the living fabric of law within the national system.
I.4 The Role of European Law Prior to Accession
Where  does  EU  law  stand  in  countries  that  are  not  yet  member  states? 
Bearing in mind the peculiar nature of the Enlargement, in my opinion, as well as in 
the opinion of Polish courts, EU law shall be obligatorily considered wherever the 
domestic  law  of  a  candidate  country  is  to  be  harmonised.  As  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court in Warsaw put it, the obligation of harmonisation of domestic 
law with EU law is improperly fulfilled not only through incorrect harmonisation 
(the  problem  relating  to  the  national  legislature),  but  also  “in  cases  when  the 
interpretation of internal legal acts by public authorities is contrary to the  acquis  
communautaire”25 (the problem relating to the national judiciary). A national judge 
19 Cf. Lando, The Principles of European Contract Law and American Legal Thinking, in: Nafziger & 
Symeonides (eds.), LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD (2002) (.), Transnational Publishers, New 
York, p. 741-749, at 743.
20 Lando&Beale (eds.), PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, (2000) Parts I and II., 2nd ed., The 
Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, at xxii.
21 Berger, see n. 18, at 887
22 Ibid., at 889. Berger is dealing with contract law, though I suppose those ideas are not limited only 
within that area of law.
23 Ibid., at 892
24 Ibid., 891 ff. 
25 The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in Warsaw of 13 March 2000 in the case of 
Senagpo,  translated in (1999-2000) 24 Polish Yearbook of International  Law p. 217, at  219. The 
Supreme Administrative Court appealed to the European tax law “as the additional grounds for its 
judgement.”  See also a  case note by Skrzydło-Tefelska,  Ibid.,  at  220 (“We should welcome with 
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shall take into account the EU rule corresponding to the national rule (for instance, a 
directive  which  has  been  implemented  by  the  candidate  state)  including  its 
interpretation by the ECJ or (ideally) also the practice in the EU member states. The 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal stated this general rule of construction of domestic 
law:
Of  course,  EU  law  has  no  binding  force  in  Poland.  The  Constitutional 
Tribunal  wishes,  however,  to  emphasise  the  provisions  of  Article  68  and 
Article  69  of  the  [Polish  Association  Agreement]  …  Poland  is  thereby 
obliged  to  use  ‘its  best  endeavours  to  ensure  that  future  legislation  is 
compatible  with  Community  legislations’  …  The  Constitutional  Tribunal 
holds that the obligation to ensure compatibility of legislation (borne, above 
all,  by  the  parliament  and  government)  results  also  in  the  obligation  to 
interpret  the  existing  legislation  in  such  a  way as  to  ensure  the  greatest  
possible degree of such compatibility.26
The Polish Constitutional  Tribunal  repeatedly  emphasised the  principle  of 
Euro-friendly interpretation of national law before European Enlargement.27
The  demand  of  Euro-friendly  interpretation  of  domestic  legislation  in  the 
associated  countries  confronted  post-communist  judges  with  a  particularly 
worrisome problem. In addition to problematic knowledge of EU law, the prevailing 
old-fashioned  concept  of  due  process  implies  that  judges  view  their  activity  as 
primarily  mechanical;  their  decisions  even  in  actual  cases  resemble  exercises  in 
deductive logic, based solely on the binding force of written domestic law. Many 
home-grown  scholars  call  the  legal  culture  prevailing  in  Central  Europe  “the 
degeneration  of  legal  positivism”  or  “a  dull  rule-positivism”.28 During  the  most 
controversial appointment of a new constitutional justice which has ever taken place 
during Havel’s presidency, the appointment of constitutional justice E. Wágnerová in 
March 2002, President Havel harshly condemned the concept of law that prevailed 
under post-communism:
It  is  mechanical,  I  would like  to say senseless,  application of  law,  which 
almost  becomes an  object  of  some cult.  … It  is  an  approach toward  the 
application of law which does not permit any control by ordinary common 
sense; neither does it allow for any consideration of the law’s sense, meaning 
or circumstances, any consideration of the probable legislative intent or even 
satisfaction the commented judgement of the SAC since it constitutes the proof that Polish courts have 
properly understood the obligation of harmonisation of Polish law with the  acquis communautaire, 
which shall be realised not only by initiatives of legal acts consistent with European law but also by 
the proper interpretation of the existing provisions.”).
26 The Gender Equality in Civil Service Case. In Polish the decision K. 15/97, OTK [Orzecznictwo 
Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, the collection of decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal], nr. 19/1997, at 
380; English translation 5 East European Case Reporter of Constitutional Law 271, at 284 (1998) 
(author’s emphasis).
27 According to the Tribunal, this principle is based on Art. 91 (1) of the 1997 Constitution – see the 
decision  K  33/03  of  April  21,  2004.  Several  days  after  the  May  1,  2004  EU  Enlargement  the 
Constitutional  Tribunal  repeated  this  principle  in  its  landmark  decision  of  May 31,  2004 on  the 
participation  of  foreigners  in  the European  Parliament  K 15/04 (it  is  possible  to  find an English 
summary of both decisions on http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/Eng/).
28 Varga,  TRANSITION TO RULE OF LAW.  ON THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN HUNGARY (1995)  
(Budapest), p. 83, p. 142 respectively.
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the  core  of  law’s  value  in  a  specific  case.  Although the  law is  a  human 
product, it attains almost metaphysical authority.29
In the legal process perceived in this way, where the judiciary is shackled by 
the chains of parochial formalism and where mechanical jurisprudence is the only 
permissible religion, the very concept of soft law as a persuasive authority (such as 
non-binding EU law having the force of persuasive and substantive argument) is not 
accorded a warm reception. In the view of mechanical jurisprudence, nothing but a 
binding source of law (i.e. statute) might be used in the judicial interpretation of law. 
In this view, law is perfect as it is written, and no loopholes or lacunae exist. Below I 
will illustrate these problems in the Czech and Slovak judiciary.
II. EU Law and the Czech courts
II.1 The ordinary judiciary
In  the  Czech  Republic,  EU  law  played  a  particularly  important  role  in 
interpreting domestic legislation on competition law. The Czech antitrust authorities 
took into account EU law in almost every important case. This practice was approved 
by  the  Czech  High  Court  in  the  Škoda  Auto case.  In  this  case,  the  appellant 
challenged the decision of the antitrust authority, with the argument that EU law was 
not a binding source of law in the national legal system. The High Court rebuffed 
this claim, emphasising international links between national antitrust laws:
The protection of free trade is specific in the fact that national law is often not 
sufficient, and therefore is often enriched by the application of rules used in 
the countries with a long aged tradition of antitrust law (Germany, USA). For 
that matter [the Czech antitrust law of 1991] received the basic ideas of the 
Treaty of Rome, particularly already mentioned Articles 85, 86 and 92; this 
was  from  the  perspective  of  harmonisation  of  the  legal  systems  of  the 
European Communities and the Czech Republic an absolute necessity.30
Subsequently the High Court concluded that it was not error of law if the 
public authority interpreted the Czech antitrust law consistently with the case law of 
the  European  Court  of  Justice  and  the  Commission.  The  decision  of  the 
Constitutional  Court  validated this  approach, emphasising that  both the Treaty of 
Rome  and  the  EU  Treaty  result  from  the  same  values  and  principles  as  Czech 
constitutional  law;  therefore,  the  interpretation  of  European  antitrust  law  by 
European bodies is valuable for the interpretation of the corresponding Czech rules.31
Apart from this field, however, judicial awareness of European law was not 
high before 1 May 2004 and EU law as an interpretational tool was rarely brought 
into play. Deep-rooted legislative optimism produces an atmosphere where ordinary 
judges and lawyers generally overemphasise the impact of legal transplants made by 
the legislature on the one hand, while seriously understating their own role in that 
process. That is why one should not be surprised that legal transplants often operate 
29 Prague, Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, March 14, 2002, a stenographic record, 
accessible in Czech on http://www.senat.cz.
30 The decision of the High Court in Olomouc, November 14, 1996 (Skoda Auto v. Czech Competition  
Authority), published in (1997) 5 (9) Právní rozhledy p. 484.
31 Škoda  Auto  Case,  Sbírka  nálezů  a  usnesení  Ústavního  soudu  [Collection  of  decisions  of  the 
Constitutional Court,  hereinafter ‘ÚS’], vol. 8, p. 149. Unlike most decisions of the constitutional 
courts  cited  in  this  article,  this  decision  relates  to  the  constitutional  complaint,  i.e.  review  of 
constitutionality of an individual decision (although of extraordinary importance as it relates to the 
antitrust penalty for the biggest firm in the country).
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in a very different way than in the donor countries. In the systems of limited law and 
limited  sources  of  law where the  idea  of  persuasive arguments  does  not  exist,  a 
sensible harmonisation is not likely to succeed. The ‘anti-European’ approach (as 
well as internationally hostile practice as a whole) of the Czech ordinary courts was 
also severely criticised by politicians.32
This path of limited law was followed by both supreme courts of the former 
Czechoslovakia. A typical example is the decision of the Slovak Supreme Court of 
25  August  1999.  In  this  case  the  Supreme  Court  was  invited  by  the  parties  to 
consider  the  fact  that  the  interpretation  of  the  law was  contrary  to  the  very  EU 
directive the law was intended to transpose. The Court openly refused to deal with 
EU law as an argumentative tool to interpret domestic law in a Euro-friendly way. 
The Court did not distinguish authoritative and persuasive arguments; because in the 
world of limited law only binding sources exist, anything else is not the law and 
cannot be used by a court. In the Slovak Supreme Court’s view, “considering the 
current stage of EU integration”, an argument based upon a European directive is not 
relevant.33
A Czech counterpart might provide a similar example. In its decision dealing 
with the validity of an agreement between a consumer and a distributor of expensive 
pottery, the consumer argued that the agreement was made contrary to sound morals, 
as  the  distributor  sold  him  exceptionally  expensive  pottery  under  very  rigid 
conditions. The consumer also argued the law of Western countries and European 
directives  and urged the  courts  to  take  these  into  account,  as  Western  European 
countries, unlike the Czech Republic, have long experience in dealing with consumer 
agreements.  None of  the three  Czech courts  dealing with the  issue accepted  this 
invitation  to  engage  in  comparative  arguments.  The  Supreme  Court  based  its 
decision on the quasi-liberal rhetoric of freedom of contract, reminiscent more of the 
ideas governing European discourse in the mid-nineteenth century than discourse 
governed by the widely shared necessity to protect the weaker party in negotiation at 
the  outset  of  the  twenty-first  century.  The  Supreme  Court  did  not  deal  with 
comparative  arguments  based  on  European  law.  Deciding  as  the  court  of  final 
instance, it understood the defendant’s arguments as arguments referring to binding 
sources. That is why it opined:
… the validity of the agreement made between the parties on August 31, 1993 
must be decided according to the then valid law, as both lower courts did. In 
contrast,  laws  and  directives  valid  in  the  countries  of  the  European 
Community are not applicable, as the Czech Republic was not (and still is 
not) a member of the Communities, and that is why the Czech Republic is not 
bound by these laws. The binding force of the rules to which the appellant 
refers cannot be inferred from any provision of the [the Czech Association 
Agreement], as the court of appeal concluded. The question of harmonisation 
of  the legal  practice of the Czech Republic with the legal  practice of the 
European Community gains increasing importance, but this cannot change the 
outcome of this case.34
32 See interview with the former Czech minister of justice Rychetský (since August 2003 the Chief 
Justice of the Constitutional Court) in the Czech daily Právo, September 25, 2002 (at 1) (noting that 
few are fully aware that ordinary judges have to deal with the bulk of international law, and after 
joining EU it will be up to them to ensure the priority of EU law over national law).
33 The decision published as n. 76 of the Slovak case reporter for 2000: Zbierka stanovísk Najvyššieho 
súdu a rozhodnutí súdov Slovenskej republiky, hereinafter ‘Zbierka’ (issue n. 4/2000, p. 55).
34 The decision of the Czech Supreme Court 25 Cdo 314/99 of December 12, 2000.
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To put it  clearly,  European law in this view can be relevant only when it 
becomes binding. Because it  was obviously not binding in a not-yet  EU member 
state,  it  was  beyond  the  orbit  of  the  ordinary  judiciary  until  Enlargement  was 
completed.  In  view  of  some  Slovak  and  Czech  judges,  their  countries  were 
implementing only texts, and nothing but these texts were used by lawyers in their 
interpretation.
II.2 The Czech Constitutional Court and EU law
The Czech Constitutional Court emphasised the special importance of EU law 
in interpreting domestic law for the first time in the  Škoda Auto case.35 Since then, 
the Court has frequently cited the European treaties and the case law of the Court of 
Justice.  European  secondary  law  is  also  sometimes  used,  especially  if  the 
constitutionality  of  the  harmonising  law  is  challenged  before  the  Constitutional 
Court.  Statutes  implementing  European  directives  in  EU member  states  are  also 
cited.36
The Constitutional Court emphasised the value of this Euro-friendly approach 
above  all  in  the  review  of  constitutionality  of  laws.  In  a  case  dealing  with  the 
authority of the national government to impose a quota on milk producers, a group of 
senators  questioned the  validity  of  the  law.  The Constitutional  Court  denied this 
argumentation, and proclaimed,  inter alia, that certain types of such regulation are 
permitted  also  under  EU  law  or  GATT.  Further,  the  regulation  subject  to 
constitutional review was a step toward approximation with EU law. The petitioners, 
however,  argued  that  European  law was  impossible  to  apply  because  it  was  not 
binding (note here a tension between binding and persuasive sources of law, linking 
the debate throughout this article).  The Court rebuffed this idea,  emphasising the 
existence of general principles of law, common to all EU member states. The content 
of these principles is formed by common European values; the general principles fill 
the abstract concept of the state governed by the rule of law including human rights. 
The Constitutional Court must apply these principles, and thus follow European legal 
culture and its constitutional traditions. “The primary law of the EU is not a foreign 
law  to  the  Constitutional  Court;  it  radiates,  mainly  as  the  general  principles  of 
European law, to a large extent into this Court’s adjudication.”37 In other words – the 
Czech Constitutional Court refuted the concept of law composed only of binding 
sources of law and permitted a broader conception.
This  approach  was  also  applied  in  the  recent  case  of  quotas  for  sugar 
producers.38 In its approval of the Czech government’s authority to impose quotas on 
sugar production, the Constitutional Court also referred to Western European policies 
and the case law of the Court of Justice.39 The Court reasoned consequentially:
35 See n. 30 and n. 31 and the accompanying text.
36 See, for example, the Czech Railway Law Case, published as n. 144/2002 of the Official Gazette 
“Sbírka zákonů” [hereinafter ‘Sb.’] (citing European directives and laws of the EU member states, 
like  the  German Federal  Railway Law of  1993,  the Railway Law of  the German  länder Baden-
Würtemberg of 1995, etc.).
37 Milk Quota Case, published as 410/2001 Sb. Under European law it would be unlikely to consider 
milk quotas as an example of the general principles of European law. However, it is not entirely clear 
what these principles are according to the Czech Court – whether the milk quotas themselves or the 
right to free enterprise (as this right forms the core of European legal culture, the presence of the milk 
quotas within EU legal order would lead to the conclusion that there is no breach of this right).
38 Sugar Quota Case, published as 499/2002 Sb.
39 The comparative range was, however, much wider and also covered extensive treatment of the US 
Supreme Court’s case law.
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A Constitutional Court’s radical interference with the scheme of production 
quotas would represent a step towards the concept of nationally guaranteed 
basic  rights;  this  would  conflict  with  the  planned  accession  of  the  Czech 
Republic to the EU.
In contrast, five dissenting justices in two powerful opinions argued that the 
Czech approach is far more invasive than the European model and, therefore, should 
have been invalidated. Both the majority and the dissenting justices were in favour of 
the application of European law, although they differed in the reading of this law and 
the limits of the national governments in that phase of the accession process.40
III. Some reasons for the disparity of the use of comparative and international 
law: the difference between the Czecho/Slovak and Polish situation
III.1 Slovak and Czech phenomenon: omnipotence of the constitutional courts
Both the Slovak and Czech constitutional courts in the 1990s substantially 
changed a deeply rooted concept of law and its application. The courts also achieved 
this through the application of foreign laws, including considerable inspiration by the 
decisions of the Court  of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.  The 
constitutional courts have the potential to influence ordinary judges to conceive law 
in a more material way. On the other hand, as I have indicated, the use of European 
and international law by the ordinary judiciary was extremely rare prior to the 2004 
Accession.41 This means that the reception of foreign ideas occurred only on one 
adjudicative (constitutional) level.
This  problem might be illustrated using the example of the application of 
international law in Central Europe. The Czechoslovak approach after the collapse of 
the communist regime in 1989 was originally rather unique and only international 
human rights treaties were incorporated and became the law of the land in 1991. This 
approach was followed by the Czech and Slovak constitution writers.42 International 
law, save by the constitutional courts, was rarely applied.
In 2001, both the Czech and Slovak republics made international law directly 
enforceable in their domestic legal systems. The Slovak Constitution, as amended by 
the constitutional law of 2001,43 states that international treaties on human rights and 
basic freedoms, international  treaties which can be applied without a statute,  and 
international treaties which deal with rights or duties of natural or legal persons, if 
ratified  and  published  in  the  manner  stipulated  by  law,  shall  have  priority  over 
statutes. According to Article 10 of the Czech Constitution, as amended by the so-
called  “Euro-amendment”,44 international  treaties,  whose  ratification  has  been 
40 Cf. particularly the dissenting opinion of E. Wágnerová and others in the  Sugar Quota Case, see 
n.40, who argued that the Constitutional Court must fulfil also “an integrating function”.
41  The first year of EU membership in both countries has shown that nothing substantial has changed 
since May 1, 2004.
42 Professor Eric Stein proposed the general reception of international law for the federal constitution 
of  former  Czechoslovakia.  See  Stein,  CZECHO-SLOVAKIA,  ETHNIC CONFLICT,  CONSTITUTIONAL FISSURE, 
NEGOTIATED BREAKUP (1997) Ann Arbor, at 358, note 10. However, in 1992 both nations, pressed for 
time,  opted for the easier solution and adhered to the Czechoslovak approach of 1991. For more 
details, see Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern  
European Constitutions? (1994) 88 American Journal of International Law p. 427.
43 Art.  7(5),  as  amended  by  the  constitutional  law  n.  90/2001  Z.z.  The  English  version  of  the 
Constitution  as  amended  in  2001  is  accessible  on  the  web  page  of  the  Constitutional  Court, 
http://www.concourt.sk.
44 Constitutional  law n.  395/2001 Sb.  (in  effect  since  June  1,  2002).  The English  version  of  the 
Constitution  as  amended  in  2001  is  accessible  on  the  web  page  of  the  Constitutional  Court, 
10
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
approved by the Parliament,  and which binds the Czech Republic, are part of the 
legal order; if an international treaty contains a provision differing from a statute, the 
former shall be applied.45
International law thus takes priority over ordinary statutes (notwithstanding 
whether  enacted  earlier  or  not).  However,  the  firmly  established  paradigm  of 
centralised  constitutional  review  in  Slovakia  vested  the  exclusive  prerogative  to 
review any conflict of statutes with international treaties in its constitutional court.46 
Therefore, ordinary Slovak judges do not have the power to set aside domestic law in 
conflict  with international  law and shall  refer any such case to the Constitutional 
Court. It is rather an exceptional position from the comparative perspective.47 
This  seems  to  develop  a  further  gap  between  ordinary  judges  and 
constitutional  courts,  and might  hinder  the  potential  of  ordinary  judges  who  are 
inclined to distinguish between “them” (constitutional justices, the only judges who 
adjudicate  in an activist  way and deal  with abstract  principles  of law),  and “us” 
(ordinary judges, who are supposed to strictly adhere like a machine to the letter of 
the statute). Therefore, international treaties are not viewed as a common source of 
law for the public authorities, but rather as something which is a matter of interest 
only for justices of the Constitutional Court. This did not promote the use of EU law 
as soft law prior to accession and also did not create good expectations vis-à-vis the 
application of EU law after accession. It might also cause other problems, such as a 
further expansion of the Slovak Constitutional Court’s already tight docket.
This paradigmatic “Czecho/Slovak” attitude toward centralised constitutional 
review has been confirmed by the recent Czech case. In contrast with the earlier 
approach,  the Czech Constitution as amended in 2001 implies that  both ordinary 
courts  and public  authorities  have  the duty to set  aside  a  domestic  statute  if  the 
conflict with a ratified international treaty cannot be solved otherwise. This was an 
important move, as the Czech Constitution as valid prior to 2002 vested exclusive 
power to control conflicts between international human rights treaties and domestic 
law in the Czech Constitutional Court.48
However,  the  Constitutional  Court,  deciding  three  weeks  after  the  “Euro-
amendment” to the Constitution had entered into force,49 reasoned in dicta against the 
clear wording of the Constitution and held that  the power to adjudicate conflicts 
between  domestic  statutes  and  international  human  rights  treaties  was  still 
exclusively vested in the Constitutional Court and each ordinary court must refer 
these  issues  to  the  former  court.  The  Court  argued  through  Art.  9(2)  of  the 
Constitution  (“eternal”  clause  providing  that  basic  principles  of  the  rule  of  law 
http://www.concourt.cz.
45 Not  every  treaty  requires  approval  by  the  Parliament  for  ratification  (Art.  49  of  the  Czech 
Constitution) – in the case of such a treaty, Article 10 is not applicable.
46 In the case of Slovakia, see Art. 125(1)(a) and Art. 144(2) of the Constitution as amended in 2001 
and cf. Art. 95(2) of the Czech Constitution until 2002 (and subsequent reading of this article by the 
Constitutional Court).
47 In  countries  where  international  treaties  have  been incorporated  into  the  domestic  system,  the 
ordinary courts ensure the application of international treaties and, in the case of conflicts between the 
treaty and the statute, set aside the latter and apply the former. In Germany, Italy or the United States 
it is subject to the principle of lex posterior, while in the Netherlands, France, Belgium etc. the treaty 
takes priority over both prior and posterior statutes. Cf. generally Cassese, Modern Constitutions and 
International Law, (1985) 192 (III) Recueil des Cours 330.
48 See Art. 87(1) (a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic until June 1, 2002.
49 The decision of June 25, 2002, published as n. 403/2002 Sb. (the case of constitutionality of the 
Bankruptcy law).
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cannot be changed even by constitutional amendment50) and concluded that transfer 
of the power to set aside the law to ordinary courts would impair the constitutional 
protection of human rights, which is with regard to Art. 9(2) not acceptable. It is 
interesting how alleged differences between common law and Continental law might 
work even in the brains of quite sophisticated constitutional justices and how these 
differences  might  be  held  irreversible.  In  a  system  without  a  binding  judicial 
precedent, the Court argued, only a centralised system of judicial review might work. 
In other words, the Czech Constitutional Court entrenched centralised judicial review 
(supposedly only vis-à-vis human rights), because the Court reserved exclusively for 
itself and forever to decide on any conflict between international human rights issue 
and domestic law.
The real, although not disclosed, rationale of the Czech Constitutional Court’s 
approach is easy to detect. This is the fear of the Constitutional Court that if the issue 
of  international  law were  beyond  its  reach,  international  treaties,  considering  the 
opinions inside the ordinary judiciary, would rarely be applied. As I have already 
shown,  the  application  of  international  law  is  obviously  contrary  to  the  deeply 
entrenched ideals of textual positivism in the region. Facing this dreadful situation, 
one would be very prone to concede that the Czech Constitutional Court’s decision 
not  to  give  up  its  power  and  save  the  application  of  international  treaties  was 
reasonable. What is worrisome, however,  is the fact that the Constitutional Court 
openly resigned from the idea that the ordinary courts would ever be able to apply 
international law and set aside municipal law for its conflict with an international 
treaty. This does not promote the use of EU law following European Enlargement. 
The  ECJ’s  role  in  interpreting  the  community  law  is  not  an  equivalent  of  the 
constitutional tribunal in a rigidly centralised system; moreover, the current trend of 
the ECJ’s adjudication seems to give even more discretion to the national judges.51 
Therefore,  with the decentralised  review of national  legislation  on its  conformity 
with European law, the current Czecho/Slovak ideology of textual positivism and 
rigid  adherence  to  the  text  of  domestic  law,  including  the  rigid  adherence  to 
centralised judicial review,52 will suffer a serious backlash.
III.2  The  case  of  Poland:  a  mixed  system  of  centralised  and  decentralised 
constitutional review
The  Polish  situation  and  application  of  international  and  European  law 
seemed to be more encouraging.53 Already in 1995 the Supreme Court proclaimed 
50 The Czech eternal  clause,  unlike its  German counterpart,  does not enumerate  these entrenched 
principles.
51 Tridimas, Enforcing Community Rights in National Courts: Some Recent Developments, In: David 
O’ Keeffe (ed.), JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW. LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF 
HADLEY (2000)), Kluwer, p. 465, at 466 (noting that at the European Court of Justice there is ‘the 
tendency of the case-law to leave discretion to national courts in determining whether the national 
rules of procedure provide a sufficient level of protection for Community rights in issue.’).
52  Cf. Comella, The European model of constitutional review of legislation: Toward decentralization? 
(2004) 2 Int’l J. of Constitutional Law p. 461. This author claims that the centralised model of 
constitutional review seems to be in crisis, facing both internal and external problems.
53 Cf. see n. 8-9 and accompanying text. See, further, for example, Leszczyński,  Application of the  
European Convention in the Polish Courts: An Impact on the Judicial Argumentation, (1996) 2 East 
European Human Rights Review p. 19, 37 (characterising the change of judicial attitude toward the 
Convention as “the strenuous process of shaping the attitude according to which the court would be 
able to directly implement the international law of Human Rights in its decisions”); Wyrozumska, 
Impact of the case-law of the organs of the European Convention on Human Rights on domestic law  
and the national judge, In: Council of Europe, The judge and international law, Multilateral meeting 
Bucharest, 28-30 November 1994 (Strasbourg 1998), p. 139, 149 ff. (citing numerous examples of the 
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that “since Polish accession to the Council of Europe the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg may and should be taken into consideration to 
interpret the provisions of the Polish law.”54 A similarly open attitude existed vis-à-
vis EU law.55
The apparent difference between the Polish and Czech judiciary might be due 
to the fact that in Poland, unlike the Czech Republic, the Constitutional Tribunal was 
weaker  in  relation  to  the  ordinary  judiciary  and  has  never  been  omnipotent. 
Therefore,  the  ordinary  judiciary,  particularly  the  Supreme  Court,  had  greater 
responsibility in human rights protection. Further, the Polish courts had much more 
experience in treaty application, including in the era of communist rule.56 Further, 
and even more importantly,  the judicial  activism of the Polish courts has always 
appeared much stronger than the activism of the Czecho/Slovak courts.57 Not only 
did the Polish ordinary courts use their power to set acts of parliament aside, they 
also tried to interpret them consistently with international treaties.58
Last but not least, the more activist ordinary courts of Poland were able to 
retain their power to set aside the law in conflict with international treaty. In doing 
so, the judges of ordinary courts argued by the Constitution of 1997, which provides 
that “[a]ny court may refer a question of law to the Constitutional Tribunal as to the 
conformity of a normative act with the Constitution, ratified international agreements 
or statute, if the answer to such question of law will determine an issue currently 
before such court.”59 This article read by ordinary judges established their judicial 
discretion  whether  to  refer  the  issue  to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal.  While  the 
question of whether ordinary judges have this right in relation to the Constitution is 
highly controversial, the competence of the Polish ordinary courts to set aside the 
law for its conflict with international treaty (either prior or posterior to the law) has 
never been seriously questioned (in spite of the possible alternative reading of Art. 
193).60
Polish  Supreme  Court’s  case  law  even  before  the  Convention  had  become  the  law  of  Poland); 
Wyrozumska,  Direct  Application of  the Polish Constitution and International  Treaties  to Private  
Conduct (2001) 25 Polish Yearbook of International Law p. 5, hereinafter ‘Direct Application’ (citing 
judicial  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  applying  international  treaties,  European  law  and  the 
constitution in a horizontal way).
54 The Court’s main rationale was not strictly legal, but, as the Court itself admitted, was rather based 
on “the Polish interest of not being criticised by the European Court of Human Rights or doctrine of 
international law or even popular newspapers.” Wyrozumska, Impact of the case-law of the organs of  
the European Convention on Human Rights on domestic law and the national judge, see n.39, at 150, 
citing the decision of the Supreme Court of January 11, 1995.
55 For many examples, see Czapliński, Harmonisation of Laws in the European Community and 
Approximation of Polish Legislation to Community Law (2001) 25 Polish Yearbook of International 
Law p. 45, 55 ff.
56 Cf. Wyrozumska, Direct Application, see n.53, at 23, emphasising this historical aspect.
57 The Polish courts were more inclined than their Czechoslovak counterparts to apply international 
law before the 1990s; e.g. Skubiszewski,  Poland’s Constitution and the Conclusion of the Treaties 
(1957) 7 Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht p. 213, 222 ff.; Skubiszewski, Glosa do postanowienia z  
25 VIII 1987, I PRZ 8/87, Umowy międzynarodowe w porządku prawnym PRL [A note to the decision 
of 8/25 1987, I PRZ 8/87, International Treaties in the legal order of the People’s Republic of Poland], 
(1989) 44/6 Państwo i Prawo p. 135; Czapliński,  International Law and Polish Domestic Law, in: 
Müllerson, Fitzmaurice, Andenas (eds.), CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE (1998) Kluwer 1998.
58 Cf.  the  decision  of  the  Supreme Administrative  Court  of  Poland of  August  26,  1999 (V S.A. 
708/99), interpreting the Aliens Act consistently with the Geneva Convention on Refugees (translated 
in (1999-2000) 24 Polish Yearbook of International Law, p. 223).
59 Art. 193 (author’s emphasis).
60 Wyrozumska, Direct Application, see n.53, at 23. 
13
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
IV. Conclusion
The association agreements with the post-communist nations aspiring to join 
the EU put immense burdens on their changing legal systems. A complex process of 
harmonisation of domestic law with the acquis communautaire is a major challenge 
to the immature legal orders of Central  Europe. It  would be futile to put all  the 
energy relating to this process only on the national legislature. On the contrary, the 
ultimate success of harmonisation depends on the judiciaries of the candidate states. 
Their judges have to adjudicate with the goal of an integrated Europe in mind. After 
all, that is why many scholars claim that there is not only one European Court, but in 
fact thousands of European courts, dispersed throughout the territory of the EU.61
In Central Europe, it means extending the legal discourse and leaving some 
deeply rooted assumptions about the law. International and European discourse must 
involve ordinary judges. The European legal culture is by its very nature inclusive. If 
all judges of the candidate countries acted as if they already were European judges, 
the first day after EU enlargement would not mean a legal revolution annihilating 
entirely the philosophy of the old system; on the contrary, this would mean a mere 
continuation of the process already started by the association treaties. And even more 
importantly, if we maintain that EU law shall be obligatorily considered wherever the 
domestic law of a candidate country is to be harmonised, we might reach the point 
where not the texts but rather the laws are being harmonised.
61 This is the primary idea of Slaughter,  Sweet,  Weiler (eds.),  THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL 
COURTS – DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (1998) Oxford.
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